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New Developments in Experiments for Agricultural Economics (Jason
Shogren, University of Wyoming, presiding)
THE PUBLIC GOOD VALUE OF INFORMATION FROM
AGRIBUSINESSES ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
WALLACE E. HUFFMAN, MATTHEW ROUSU, JASON F. SHOGREN,
AND ABEBAYEHU TEGENE
Some people hail using biotechnology to cre-
ate genetically modified (GM) food prod-
ucts as a major revolution in product inno-
vation. Some, however, do not view these
products favorably. International environmen-
tal groups like Greenpeace and Friends of
the Earth have become the main antagonists
against the use of genetic engineering for
developing new products. Through press re-
leases, websites, and protests, these environ-
mental groups publicize their views on GM
foods and how these products affect consumers
and producers. They demonstrate and dissem-
inate information, with the goal of affecting
consumer (and possibly producer) behavior.
Greenpeace, for example, argues that the un-
known effects of using GM products could
be disastrous to the environment and human
health, that multinational agribusiness com-
panies control genetic modification, and that
GM foods pose a risk of allergens spreading
to food products other than those that nor-
mally carry allergens (Greenpeace Interna-
tional 2001a,b,c; Friends of the Earth).
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In contrast, the agribusiness community,
led by Monsanto and Syngenta, has been ex-
tremely optimistic about the potential of GM
technologies and GM foods. For example, they
suggest that GM plants and animals have the
potential to be one of the greatest discover-
ies in the history of farming. GM technology
is reducing the cost of food and fiber pro-
duction, reducing the rate of application of
chemical pesticides, and reducing the rate of
farm worker poisoning. In the future, GM
crops will contain enhanced vitamins (e.g.,
Vitamin A) and protein content and reduced
saturated fat content. Furthermore, agribusi-
nesses claim that GM foods can help end world
hunger. Recently the agricultural biotechnol-
ogy industry formed a public information arm
called the Council for Biotechnology Informa-
tion (Council for Biotechnology Information).
This coalition was designed in large part to
counteract the negative information on agri-
cultural biotechnology being disseminated by
environmental groups.
Agribusiness companies and the Council
for Biotechnology Information release private
information through news releases, websites,
television commercials, annual reports, and
even children’s coloring books. These compa-
nies expect this information to increase con-
sumer and producer demand for GM products
above what it would be otherwise. They an-
ticipate that the market demand for new GM
products will be large enough to recover R&D
and advertising costs and earn at least a normal
rate of return on their investment.
Also, in some cases, company advertising
serves an educational role. Advertising may
bring information on agricultural biotechnol-
ogy to consumers. In fact, drug companies of-
ten boast that their advertisements on new
drugs help inform consumers of new treatment
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options before busy doctors become aware of
pharmaceutical advances (Steyer). The value
of agricultural biotechnology information re-
leased by the agricultural biotechnology com-
panies has yet to be analyzed.
The agribusiness members who contribute
to this advertising benefit collectively to the
extent that the demand for GM products is
increased. Because the positive information
and outcomes are not specifically excludable
from nonagribusiness members, this informa-
tion may also benefit (or harm) others. Hence,
this information has potential public good at-
tributes across groups in society (Cornes and
Sandler; Andreoni). If nonagribusiness mem-
bers could be effectively excluded from the
benefits, the negative information would be a
club good to the agribusinesses (Cornes and
Sandler).1
In this paper, we postulate that positive
GM information supplied by agribusinesses
has public good value. We estimate this pub-
lic good value through the eyes of an agribusi-
ness by quantifying the “perceived public
good” value of information from agribusi-
nesses to consumers who participated in lab-
oratory experimental auctions. The perceived
public good value of information is ob-
tained from participants who changed their
behavior after receiving information from
agribusinesses.
Our results lead to two conclusions. First,
a relatively large public good value exists for
positive GM information—about 5 cents per
product purchased per consumer or almost
$3 billion nationally. Second, if a third party
produced and disseminated verifiable, inde-
pendent information on genetic modification,
the public good value of positive industry-
provided biotechnology information would
decrease dramatically—to less than 1 cent per
product purchased per consumer.
Data
We use data from the laboratory experiments
in Rousu et al. (2002), which examined the
1 Ambiguity exists over whether information from agribusi-
nesses should formally be defined as a public good or a club good.
A club good, as defined in Sandler and Tschirhart, is a “volun-
tary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing one or more of
the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics, or a
good characterized by excludable benefits.” Agribusinesses share
the production costs of information, so one might consider their
information to be a club good. Their information is disseminated
to nonmembers, and there is limited exclusion to those who are
not agribusiness members, which is why we call this information a
public good.
willingness to pay of consumers from two ma-
jor metropolitan areas for GM-labeled and
plain-labeled potatoes, vegetable oil, and tor-
tilla chips under six different information treat-
ments. We use the random nth-price auction,
which has been shown to be superior in elic-
iting an auction participant’s demand curve
(Shogren et al., 2001). This study used adult
consumers over 18 years of age from two differ-
ent Midwestern metropolitan areas that were
chosen using a random digit dialing method.
For the full description of the experimental de-
sign see Rousu et al.
In the design, three types of information
about GM and biotechnology were defined:
(a) the industry perspective—provided by a
group of leading biotechnology companies, in-
cluding Monsanto and Syngenta; (b) the en-
vironmental group perspective—provided by
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group
or biotech antagonists; and (c) the third-party
perspective—from a neutral third-party group
of scientists, professionals, religious leaders,
and academics, none of whom have a fi-
nancial stake in GM foods. For this study,
the information was organized into four
treatments: a participant could receive (a)
only anti-biotechnology information; (b) both
pro- and anti-biotechnology information;2
(c) anti-biotechnology and verifiable informa-
tion; or a participant could receive (d) pro-
biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and veri-
fiable information. These four information
treatments, each with two replications, were
randomly assigned to eight experimental units,
each containing thirteen to sixteen partici-
pants. The data collected allows estimating
how consumer behavior towards GM food
changes when information from agribusinesses
is introduced.
We summarize five key elements of the
experimental design. First, subjects submit
only one bid per product to avoid any ques-
tion of creating affiliated values, which can
affect the demand-revealing nature of the em-
ployed Vickrey-style auction (e.g., see List and
Shogren). Second, we do not endow our sub-
jects with a food item and then ask them to
“upgrade” to another food item; rather partic-
ipants are paid $40; then they bid on different
foods in only two trials. This avoids the risk
that an in-kind endowment effect distorts par-
ticipant’s bidding behavior (e.g., see Lusk and
2 When a participant received both pro-biotechnology and anti-
biotechnology information, the order was randomized, so that
some participants received the pro-biotechnology information
first, and others received the anti-biotechnology information first.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants (N = 114)
Standard
Variable Definition Mean Deviation
Gender 1 if female 0.64 0.48
Age Participant’s age 49.0 18.1
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.61 0.49
Education Years of schooling 14.64 2.27
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.75 1.78
Income Household income level (in thousands)a 52.1 31.7
White 1 if participant is white 0.86 0.35
Read L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.13
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchaseb 0.20 0.40
Informed 1 if an individual considered themselves at least
somewhat informed regarding GM foods
0.40 0.49
aThe median income of participants is $55,000.
bThese five rows do not add to 1 because of rounding.
Shroeder or Corrigan and Rousu) and of any
credit constraint. Third, each consumer bids
on three unrelated food items, such that if he
or she did not have positive demand for one
or two products, we could still obtain infor-
mation from them on their preference for ge-
netic modification based on the second and
(or) third product. Fourth, we randomly as-
sign treatments to the experimental units, so
the estimation of the treatment effect is sim-
ply the difference in means across treatments
(see Wooldridge).
Fifth, we use adult consumers over 18 years
of age from two different Midwestern metro-
politan areas that were chosen using a random
digit dialing method. Table 1 summarizes their
demographic characteristics. The demograph-
ics of our sample differ from the U.S. census
demographic characteristics for these regions,
but they are similar and provide a sufficient
representation for our initial probe into label-
ing and information for GM products (see U.S.
Census Bureau). In addition, we use common
food items that are available to shoppers in
grocery stores and supermarkets and adults
rather than students to better reflect a typi-
cal household of consumers. Although several
studies have used college undergraduates in
laboratory auctions of food items (including
Lusk et al. and Hayes et al.), they are not the
best choice for participants when the items be-
ing auctioned are ones sold in grocery stores
or supermarkets.
Using a national random sample of grocery
store shoppers, Katsaras et al. showed that the
share of college-age (18–24 years) shoppers
falls far below their share in the population
(8.5% of shoppers vs. 12.8% in the U.S. Census
of Population). College students obtain a large
share of their food from school cafeterias and
a small share from grocery stores and super-
markets compared to older shoppers (Carlson,
Kinsey, and Nadav). Although our participants
are slightly skewed toward women, Katsara
et al. showed that women make up a dispropor-
tional share of grocery store shoppers (83% of
shoppers versus 52% in the U.S. Census of Pop-
ulation). A sample primarily of grocery store
shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated
need for having students participate in sev-
eral rounds of bidding to stabilize bids for food
items. This experimental design also minimizes
Hawthorne effects in bidding (Melton et al.).
Empirical Model
Following Rousu et al. (2002, in press), we de-
fine the value of information in three steps.3
First, introducing new information does not
change the situation, only consumer’s knowl-
edge. More information cannot make con-
sumers worse off.4 Second, assuming a con-
sumer maximizes his utility, one computes the
expenditure function when the consumer has
3 Similar methods to value information from nonexperimental
data have been used by Foster and Just and by Teisl, Bockstael,
and Levy.
4 This concept is similar to the concept behind the LaChatelier
principle. With more information, one has the opportunity to adjust
his/her behavior to an optimal purchasing bundle. Consumers can
maintain the status quo or change, and they cannot be made worse
off.
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and does not have the new information. Third,
once the new information is provided, if a con-
sumer’s purchases do not change, the informa-
tion has no value. If the consumer purchases
a different bundle, they are presumed to be
better off with the new information.
Formally, information from agribusinesses
would cause some consumers to switch from
plain-labeled to GM-labeled foods because
they realize they receive higher surplus from
consuming GM-labeled foods than they re-
ceive from consuming plain-labeled foods. The
surplus for consumer j is defined as the differ-
ence in consumer j’s willingness to pay (WTPj)
minus the price (Pj) she would face for the
product in the marketplace:5
surplus jplain−labeled = WTP jplain−labeled(1)
− P jplain−labeled
surplus jlabeled = WTP jlabeled − P jlabeled.(2)
The value of information to each person who
switches is estimated by the difference in con-
sumer surplus between the GM-labeled and
plain-labeled foods:6
PREMGAIN jlabeled(3)
= surplus jlabeled − surplus jplain−labeled.
All consumers who purchase GM-labeled
foods obtain the premium (PREMGAIN) as
defined in equation (3). But this premium only
represents increased welfare (i.e., the public-
good value of information from agribusi-
nesses) for consumers who switched to GM-
labeled foods from plain-labeled foods after
receiving information from agribusinesses.7
5 We used “market” prices that we paid for plain-labeled veg-
etable oil, yellow tortilla chips and russet potatoes as the market
price for plain-labeled product: $1.65 for the 32 ounce bottle of
vegetable oil, $2.99 for the 16-ounce bag of tortilla chips, and $1.79
for the 5-pound bag of potatoes as the prices for the plain-labeled
products. For market price of GM-labeled product, we adjusted the
market price of plain-labeled price for the average GM-discount
in our experiment.
6 If consumer j purchased plain-labeled foods before they re-
ceived agribusiness information, they perceived surplus jplain−labeled
> surplus jlabeled, and thus consumed plain-labeled foods. If after
receiving information from agribusinesses, consumer j switches to
GM-labeled foods, his perception of the surplus changes such that
surplus jplain−labeled < surplus
j
labeled. The difference in surplus repre-
sents the change in consumer j’s welfare—the value of information
from agribusinesses.
7 Our experimental auction data allow us to estimate the per-
centage of consumers who would switch from GM-labeled to plain-
labeled foods because of the information from agribusinesses.
The aggregate value of information, SUM-
VAL, is the sum of the value of information for
all individuals who changed their purchases as
a result of the information from agribusinesses:
SUMVAL =
∑
j∈switched
PREMGAIN jlabeled.(4)
To determine the average value of informa-
tion from agribusinesses to a consumer who
switched from plain-labeled to GM-labeled
foods, we divide the total value of informa-
tion by the number of consumers who switched
purchases:
switchervalue = SUMVAL
N buy−switchedproduct
.(5)
We obtain the average value of information
per consumer by dividing the total value of in-
formation by the total number of consumers:
valueperson = SUMVAL
N pop
.(6)
We apply this framework to our experimen-
tal auction data to calculate the percentage of
consumers who would switch to GM-labeled
foods in two information settings: those con-
sumers initially receiving only negative infor-
mation from environmental groups, or those
consumers initially receiving both negative
information from environmental groups and
verifiable information from financially disin-
terested sources. We then compute the av-
erage public-good value of information from
agribusinesses per consumer who switches for
each product. Finally, we estimate the aver-
age public-good value of information from
agribusinesses per consumer in the population
for each product.
Results
Table 2 reports the estimate of the percentage
who would purchase GM-labeled foods both
with and without information from agribusi-
nesses. The top portion of table 2 shows
the percentage of consumers who buy GM
foods when they initially received only infor-
mation from environmental groups; the bot-
tom portion of table 2 shows the percent-
age of consumers who buy GM-labeled foods
when they initially received information from
both environmental groups and the third-party
sources. Our results show that a larger percent-
age of consumers purchase GM-labeled foods
when they receive positive information from
agribusinesses.
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Table 2. The Percentage of Participants who Purchase GM-Labeled Foods with and without
Information from Agribusinesses
Percentage Who Would Buy Percentage Who Would Buy
GM-Labeled Food without GM-Labeled Food with
Initial Information the Food Information from Information from
Consumer Received Product Agribusiness Companies Agribusiness Companies Difference
Environmental group Tortilla chips 41.4% 73.9% 32.5%
information only Vegetable oil 38.5% 58.3% 19.8%
Potatoes 37.9% 57.7% 19.8%
Environmental group Tortilla chips 60.0% 82.6% 22.6%
and verifiable Vegetable oil 66.7% 73.9% 7.2%
information Potatoes 63.0% 79.2% 16.2%
Table 3. The Public Good Value of Information from Agribusiness Companies
Percentage Who Value Per Average Value
Would Switch to GM Switcher per Person
Value to participants who originally received information
only from environmental groups
Tortilla chips 32.5 $0.188/bag $0.061/bag
Vegetable oil 19.8 $0.378/bottle $0.075/bottle
Potatoes 19.8 $0.105/bag $0.021/bag
Value to participants who originally received information from both
environmental groups and an independent, third-party group
Tortilla chips 22.6 $0.002/bag $0.000/bag
Vegetable oil 7.2 $0.153/bottle $0.011/bottle
Potatoes 16.2 $0.031/bag $0.005/bag
Table 3 shows the public-good value of GM
information from agribusinesses. The top part
of table 3 reports the value to consumers who
initially received only information from envi-
ronmental groups. For tortilla chips, over 32%
of participants would change their purchase to
GM-labeled food products from plain-labeled
ones after they received the agribusiness infor-
mation. The average public value of informa-
tion to each consumer who switched purchases
is 19 cents per bag, and the average public value
to each consumer in society is estimated to
be 6 cents per bag. For vegetable oil, GM in-
formation from agribusinesses causes almost
20% of consumers to switch, with an average
value of almost 38 cents per bottle per person
who switched. The average public value is 7.5
cents per bottle per person in society. For GM-
labeled potatoes, almost 20% of participants
switched when they received agribusiness in-
formation; the average public value per person
who switched is 10.5 cents per bag; and the av-
erage public good value is 2 cents per bag. On
average, the public-good value of GM infor-
mation from agribusinesses is approximately 5
cents per person per purchased product that
could be GM.8
The bottom part of table 3 shows the value of
agribusiness information for participants who
initially received both industry and third-party
information. Here the value of agribusiness
information is significantly lower—0.5 cents
or less for tortilla chips and potatoes and to
approximately 1 cent for the vegetable oil.
Across the three commodities, this informa-
tion is worth on average less than 1 cent per
person per product. Hence, the value of GM in-
formation from agribusinesses is largely dissi-
pated when information from third-party ver-
ifiable information is introduced. This result
suggests that participants who received ver-
ifiable information viewed agribusinesses as
a less credible source of information, which
8 Recall we used the mean discount for GM-labeled food prod-
ucts to estimate the price for GM-labeled food products. Using
alternative discounts for the GM-labeled food product, one with
a higher discount and one with a lower discount, we find similar
values to agribusiness information. The values appear robust to as-
sumption about market prices. These and any other nonpublished
results are available from the authors upon request.
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decreases the public good value of information
from the GM proponents.
Conclusion
Using data from laboratory auctions con-
ducted on a sample of adult consumers in the
Des Moines, Iowa, and St. Paul, Minnesota, ar-
eas, we estimate the public-good value of GM
information from agribusinesses. Consumers
bid on GM-labeled and plain-labeled food
products using the random nth-price auction,
with each of four experimental units receiv-
ing different information treatments. There
were two replications. We find that the av-
erage public good value of GM information
from agribusinesses is approximately 5 cents
per person for each product that could be GM,
and the aggregate value of information is ap-
proximately $3 billion annually. With a value
this large, agribusiness companies can boast
that their information not only helps their bot-
tom line, but by providing information they are
making consumers better off. The large public-
good value of information from agribusinesses
practically vanishes, however, in the presence
of independent third-party information. When
third-party information on genetic modifica-
tion is available to participants, they bid as if
they give much less weight to agribusiness in-
formation. This indicates value for verifiable
information in reducing participant reliance on
information from interested parties.
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